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Abstract
We study the optimal contracts (payment and extraction path)
implemented by a regulator unable to commit to long term contracts
that delegates the extraction of a nonrenewable resource to a firm.
The regulator wishes to maximize the tax revenue and does not know
the firm’s efficiency which is private information. As the regulator
is unable to commit, the ratchet effect appears. We show that the
contracts implemented depend on which types of firms exhaust the
stock. If both types exhaust the stock, the contracts are fully sepa-
rating and similar to those implemented under full commitment. The
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efficient firm produces the first best and gets an informational rent
whereas the inefficient one produces lower quantity. If the stock is
not exhausted, the contracts are semi separating and the inefficient
firm produces higher quantity than under full commitment and the
tax revenue is lower. However, those contracts may not be incentive
compatible if the discount factor and the second period price are high
and thus the regulator may be forced to implement a pooling contract.
Keywords: Nonrenewable resources, commitment, asymmetric information
JEL Classification: Q38, D82
1 Introduction
Despite the reinforcement of state permanent sovereignty over natural re-
sources by the United Nation Charter in 1962, governments in developing
countries may not have the technical skills (seismic surveys, drilling wells,
extraction techniques) nor the financial means (low access to capital mar-
kets) to efficiently exploit their natural resources. Hence, governments often
delegate the exploration and extraction activities to international oil com-
panies. Indeed, Eller et al. (2007) using a composite index to study the
efficiency in generating revenue from inputs of employees and oil reserves
show that international companies are more efficient than national oil com-
panies. One of the main issues of delegating the petroleum activities is the
asymmetric information problems that may arise. In fact, the government
and the oil company do not have the same goals and thus as soon as one of
them has private information, he has the incentive to use this information
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to the detriment of the other. The government seeks to promote exploration
and extraction activities, maximize its fiscal revenue and acquire some knowl-
edge. Whereas, the oil company wants a fair profit share, minimize the risks
(political and technical) and recover its investment. For more on the resource
owner and manager’s objectives, one can refer to Johnston (1994). The oil
company has more expertise to estimate the quality or the quantity of re-
sources and has more information on the technology it uses to foster and
extract the resource. As a consequence, it may have the incentive to conceal
information in order to get a higher revenue. Furthermore, the strength of
commitment that binds the oil company to the government plays a crucial
role, especially in presence of asymmetric information, as weak commitment
can lead to the ratchet effect. The non commitment reflects the limited
duration of petroleum agreements and is usually related to the incomplete
contract theory. In reality, we observe a lack of commitment from govern-
ments as they often renegotiate petroleum agreements especially when prices
are high. For example, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the increase in price of
oil led to contracts renegotiation and in some cases, nationalizations. More
recently Russia and Venezuela have also renegotiated their petroleum agree-
ments.
A considerable amount of literature has been published on principal-agent
models without commitment and only few papers use the contract theory
approach to study the natural resource management.
The allocation under full commitment is not time consistent as in the
second period, the inefficient firm and the regulator may benefit from a rene-
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gotiation. However, this ex post renegotiation changes ex ante incentives, as
the quantity of the inefficient firm increases, the informational rent given to
the efficient firm should increase as well. The non commitment literature
such as Freixas et al. (1985), Laffont and Tirole (1988), Laffont and Tirole
(1990) and Dionne and Fluet (2000) pointed out two important effects. In the
settings where an economic agent (the principal) delegates the production to
another economic agent without knowing the agent’s type (efficient or inef-
ficient in production activity), some pooling can be optimal and both types
may have the incentive to lie. Indeed, under no commitment the principal
can use the information learned in early periods to design future contracts
(i.e ratchet effect). To induce separation, the principal has to leave the effi-
cient type with a high informational rent in the first period. This rent should
compensate the agent for revealing its information and jeopardizing any fu-
ture informational rents. As the opportunity cost of revealing information
increases with the discount factor, the informational rent does as well. When
the discount factor is high, the efficient type may pool with an inefficient one
to keep future informational rents. Separation becomes so costly that some
pooling can be optimal. Moreover, as a consequence, the inefficient firm may
adopt the "take-the-money-and-run" strategy, it chooses the efficient type’s
contract in the first period and then quits the relationship.
So far, the principal-agent model has rarely been used to study delegation
contracts between the government and the oil company. One can cite two
main attempts to introduce asymmetric information in delegation contracts
for non renewable resource. Gaudet et al. (1995) and Osmundsen (1998)
study in a two-period model the impact on the optimal contract of asym-
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metric information on the productive efficiency. Both consider only one firm
(the agent) and one regulator (the principal) and no exploration. In the first
paper, the efficiency changes at each period, the contract is a two-period
contract but the firm can opt out in the second period if its efficiency is re-
ally low. Gaudet et al. (1995) mainly focus on the dynamics implied by the
resource constraint and show that when it is optimal for all types of firms to
exhaust the stock, the inefficient firms should produce lower quantity than
the first best (symmetric information case) whereas the efficient firm should
produce the first best (no distortion at the top). However, if it is not optimal
for some types of firms to exhaust the stock in the second period, it may
be optimal for the most efficient firm to produce more than the first best.
Indeed, its second-period extraction may be lower than the first best if it
is inefficient in the second period. Osmundsen (1998) assumes full commit-
ment, an efficiency parameter correlated with the stock of resources (which
is private information) and that it is never optimal to exhaust the stock. He
mainly focuses on the impact of the stock effect on the optimal contracts and
assumes that the efficiency decreases as the stock is depleted. He finds that
at each period no distortion at the top is optimal and that the productive
distortion of the inefficient firms should be higher in the first period as this
extraction increases the second period costs. Two other papers study the
effect of adverse selection on the firm’s efficiency in the context of delegation
contract of non renewable natural resource management. Osmundsen (1998)
is the continuation of the static model developed in Osmundsen (1995) in
which non neutral taxation such as a menu of linear tax contracts composed
of a license fee and a royalty can be optimal. Moreover, Hung et al. (2006)
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show that, under asymmetric information the contract duration is longer
than under symmetric information whereas the scarcity rent is lower. They
also show that just before the end of the contract the firm may produce
higher quantity than the first best. The main contribution of this paper is
to relax the two-period assumptions.
The objective of our paper is to complement those works by introducing
an informational dynamics. We study the concession contracts implemented
if the government and the firm are unable to commit to long term contracts
and if the firm has private information on its extraction costs. In addition,
as in Hung et al. (2006), we consider firms with a constant efficiency param-
eter. We study an extreme case of ratchet effect given that if the information
is revealed in the first period, there is symmetric information in the second
one. We consider two types of firms, only two periods and a two contract
menu. We use the same approach as Laffont and Tirole (1993) (chapter 9)
but adapt it to a nonrenewable resource market as we add to the incentive
and participation constraints a stock constraint. This model captures two
types of dynamics; one from the exhaustibility and one from the ratchet ef-
fect. We study how the non commitment impacts the incentives, the tax
revenue and the extraction path. Moreover, we study the impact of the dis-
count factor and compare the extraction path to the one under symmetric
information and asymmetric information and full commitment.
Because of the stock constraint, new effects appear compared to standard
principal-agent models:
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First, as in a standard model, there is a trade off between rent extrac-
tion and productive efficiency. By decreasing the extraction requested from
a less efficient firm, the principal is able to reduce the informational rent and
thus increase its payoff. As the less efficient firm’s extraction decreases, its
contract becomes less attractive for an efficient firm and the informational
rent is lower. However, as we consider a nonrenewable resource, if the stock
is exhausted, this rent extraction efficiency trade off changes. By decreasing
the less efficient firm’s extraction in the first period in order to lower the in-
formational rent left, the regulator automatically increases the second period
extraction and thus the informational rent left at this period.
Then, when it is optimal for both types of firms to exhaust the stock,
the cumulated extraction is the same for both types and this may lower the
contract’s incentive power. Indeed, an efficient firm may produce the same
quantity whether it reveals or lies.
Finally, an increase in the discount factor has two effects, on the one hand
it slows the extraction down (non renewable resource effect) and on the other
hand, it decreases the incentive to the firm to jeopardize future informational
rent (adverse selection effect).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general settings
and the assumptions. Section 3 characterizes the benchmarks: the optimal
contracts under symmetric information and under asymmetric information
and full commitment. In section 4, we compute the allocation under non com-
mitment, and find that the contracts implemented depend on which types of
firms exhaust the stock. The contracts might be the same as under full com-
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mitment or semi separating contracts such that the inefficient firm produces
higher quantity than under full commitment. The latter contracts induces a
lower tax revenue and may not be incentive compatible if the discount factor
and the second period price are high. We end this paper with the conclusion
in section 5.
2 General settings
As in Gaudet et al. (1995) and Osmundsen (1998), we consider two periods
t = {1, 2} and no competition within the regulators and the firms (only one
resource owner and one firm interact). As in the previous models, we assume
that the exploration has been completed and there is no fixed cost. The firm’s
cost function is the same as Gaudet et al. (1995) with a constant efficiency
parameter θ.
C(θ, qt) = θ qt +
b
2 qt
2
The regulator knows b > 0 and is able to verify the quantity extracted qt
and the price of the resource pt but does not know θ and has prior belief on
the probability to face one type of firms. With probability ν0 the regulator
faces an efficient firm θ and with the complementary probability, he faces
a inefficient firm θ where θ < θ and θ < pt. We denote: ∆θ = θ − θ and
δ ∈ [0, 1] the discount factor.
The regulator designs a contract that specifies the quantity qt that should
be extracted and the transfer tt he will receive at each period t. The firm
gets all the profit from the extraction and pays a transfer at each period to
8
the regulator. The regulator’s payoff is the discounted sum of transfer. As
oil companies are often multinational, the regulator only cares about the tax
revenue generated from the extraction and does not consider the firm’s profit
in his payoff function. The firm only has a secondary role as the quantity
is imposed by the regulator and the firm only decides if it participates and
under which contract. We denote UR and UF respectively the regulator and
the firm’s payoff.
UR = t1 + δ t2
UF = p1 q1 − C(θ, q1)− t1 + δ [p2 q2 − C(θ, q2)− t2]
The regulator maximizes its payoff subject to the firm’s participation and a
stock constraint which states that the quantity extracted cannot exceed the
initial stock of resource S. We normalize the outside opportunity of the firm
to zero and if there is asymmetric information, we add incentive constraints.
The first period affects the second period, as the stock of resource available
in the second period decreases with the first period extraction. One solve
this problem using backward induction.
We use the following subscripts: (FB) for symmetric information, (FC)
for asymmetric information and full commitment, (NC) for asymmetric in-
formation and non commitment.
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3 Benchmark
3.1 Symmetric information
If we assume risk neutral agents, only the aggregate transfer matters and the
firm is indifferent between paying tt at each period or T = t1 + δ t2 as an
upfront payment. The regulator maximize its payoff (1) subject to the firm’s
participation (2) and a stock constraint (3). Solving this problem, one can
define the first best’s contracts.
max
{T,q1,q2}
UR = T (1)
subject to
UF = p1 q1 − C(θ, q1) + δ [p2 q2 − C(θ, q2)]− T ≥ 0 (2)
q1 + q2 ≤ S (3)
The constraint (2) binds, the regulator gets all the profits. Introducing (2)
in (1):
max
{q1,q2}
UR = T = p1 q1 − C(θ, q1) + δ [p2 q2 − C(θ, q2)] subject to (3) (4)
The extraction depends on S, p1, p2, b and θ. There are 6 solutions (0, S),
(S, 0), (q1NE, 0), (0, q2NE), (q1NE, q2NE), (q1E, S − q1E). We focus on two
solutions:
If θa ≤ θ ≤ pt, (3) does not bind and the extraction is: qFBtNE = pt−θb
with t = {1, 2}
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If θb ≤ θ ≤ Min {θc, θa}, (3) binds and the extraction is: qFB1E = p1+δ (bS−p2)−(1−δ) θb(1+δ)
and qFB2E = S − qFB1E
The subscripts NE and E stands respectively for not exhausted and ex-
hausted (in period 2) and θa = p2+p1−bS2 , θb =
p1−δ p2−bS
1−δ and θc =
p1−δ p2+δ bS
1−δ
Lemma 1 The stock is exhausted if the price is high in both periods, the
firm efficient and the stock is relatively low. Moreover, the firm spreads the
extraction if the price path is smooth and the stock high enough. The first
period extraction depends on whether the remaining stock is exhausted at the
second period.
The efficiency increases the extraction except in the second period if the
stock is exhausted. If δ = 1, the extraction is independent from the efficiency,
the firms produce the same quantity. If the stock is exhausted, the extraction
follows a standard Hotelling rule, the higher the discount factor is, the less
intensive the extraction is. If the price is constant over time, the extraction
path is decreasing.
3.2 Asymmetric information and full commitment
We denote U and U respectively, the efficient and the inefficient firm’s payoff
and (q1, q2, T ) and (q1, q2, T ) their respective contracts. If the regulator does
not know the firm’s efficiency, the first best contracts cannot be used as the
firm lies when the contract designed for the other type gives a positive payoff.
The firm may lie (L) or reveal (R) its type.
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UL = ∆θ(qFB1 + δqFB2 ) ≥ 0 and UL = −∆θ(qFB1 + δqFB2 ) ≤ 0
The efficient firm has the incentive to undervalue its efficiency to receives
the cost differential. The inefficient firm has never the incentive to lie as this
implies a high extraction compared to its efficiency (there is no countervail-
ing incentives). Thus, in case of asymmetric information we have to define
another type of contracts.
If the regulator can fully commit to long term contracts, he proposes in
the first period a contract designed for each firm that specifies the transfer he
receives and the quantity extracted at each period. The regulator maximizes
his payoff subject to the firm’s participation (6) and (7), incentive (8) and (9)
and stock (11) and (10) constraints. This is a special case of Gaudet et al.
(1995) where the efficiency is constant and with only two types. Therefore,
the results are similar but are recalled as they are used as a benchmark.
max
{q1,q2,T},{q1,q2,T}
UFCR = ν0 T + (1− ν0)T (5)
subject to
U(q1, q2, T ) ≥ 0 (6)
U(q1, q2, T ) ≥ 0 (7)
U(q1, q2, T ) ≥ U(q1, q2, T ) (8)
U(q1, q2, T ) ≥ U(q1, q2, T ) (9)
q1 + q2 ≤ S (10)
q1 + q2 ≤ S (11)
The constraints (8) and (7) imply (6). This is a standard problem where we
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should consider (7) and (8) binding. We check ex post if the non binding
constraints are satisfied at the equilibrium.
The efficient firm extracts the first best quantity in both periods.
The inefficient firm produces lower quantity than the first best and there
are still 6 solutions depending on S,p1, p2, b, θ, θ and ν0. We focus on two
solutions:
If θa(1 − ν0) + ν0θ ≤ θ ≤ pt(1 − ν0) + ν0θ, (11) does not bind and it is
optimal to extract at each period: qFCt = qFBtNE − ∆θ ν0b (1−ν0)
If θb(1−ν0)+ν0θ ≤ θ ≤ Min {θc(1− ν0) + ν0θ, θa(1− ν0) + ν0θ}, (11) binds
and it is optimal to extract qFC1E = qFB1E − ∆θ ν0 (1−δ)b (1−ν0) (1+δ) and qFC2E = S − qFC1E
Lemma 2 Compared to symmetric information, the inefficient firm’s ex-
traction is lower. The firm may not exhaust the stock or extract the resource
whereas under symmetric information it would have been optimal. Because
of the rent efficiency trade off, the size of asymmetric information (∆θ) and
the probability to face an efficient firm (ν0) decrease the inefficient firm’s
extraction. This is a special case of Gaudet et al. (1995).
When the stock is exhausted, the discount factor decreases the distor-
tion in the first period but still decreases the inefficient firm’s first period
extraction, this is consistent with the Hotelling rule. If δ = 1, then both firm
produce the same quantity (the first best) and the efficient firm gets a really
high informational rent. Under full commitment, the optimal static contracts
are used, there is no distortion at the top and the inefficient firm extracts
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lower quantity than the first best. Because of the informational rent, the
regulator’s payoff is lower than under symmetric information. The discount
factor has no effect on the contracts implemented except through the stock
constraint if the stock is exhausted.
One can show that the non binding constraints (9) and (6) are satisfied:
UR = UL = ∆θ(qFC1 + δ qFC2 ) ⇔ (6) is always satisfied.
UR = 0 and UL = −∆θ [qFC1 − qFC1 + δ (qFC2 − qFC2 )]⇔ (9) is always satisfied
as the efficient firm always produces at least as much as the inefficient one.
4 Asymmetric information and non commit-
ment
Under non commitment, the regulator proposes at each period a contract
designed for each type. We denote (tt, qt) and (tt, qt) the contracts designed
for the efficient and inefficient type at period t = {1, 2}. The second period
contracts are designed after the regulator observed the contract chosen in
the first period. The regulator updates its prior belief (ν0) according to a
Bayesian rule and the posterior belief ν1 are such that:
ν1 = x ν0x ν0+y (1−ν0) and ν1 =
(1−x) ν0
(1−x) ν0+(1−y) (1−ν0) with x+ y > 0
ν1 is the probability that the firm is efficient knowing that it chooses
{
q1, t1
}
ν1 is the probability that the firm is efficient knowing that it chooses {q1, t1}
x is the probability that the efficient firm chooses
{
q1, t1
}
in the first period.
y is the probability that the inefficient firm chooses
{
q1, t1
}
in the first period.
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The type of equilibrium depends on the x and y values:
• A fully separating equilibrium occurs in the first period when (x =
1, y = 0) or (x = 0, y = 1). Updating is perfect and the regulator is
able to fully identify the type of firms he faces. In the second period,
there is symmetric information
• A semi-separating equilibrium occurs in the first period when one type
of firms plays a pure strategy while the other plays a mixed strategy.
In the second period, the regulator imperfectly updates his belief.
• A pooling equilibrium occurs in the first period when both types choose
the same strategy (x = y = 1) or (x = y = 0). In the second period,
no updating is possible and ν0 = ν1.
Steps of the game:
• Depending on its prior belief ν0, the regulator proposes one contract
for each type (t1, q1) and (t1, q1) .
• The firm chooses one contract and the regulator updates his belief (he
may have full information) depending on the contract chosen.
• Depending on his updated belief ν1, the regulator proposes one contract
for each type (t2, q2) and (t2, q2) or the first best contract if he knows
the firm’s type.
The firm chooses its strategy (reveal or lie) in the first period taking into
account that revealing its type may jeopardize future informational rents.
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The higher the opportunity cost of revealing is, the less it reveals. To design
the four contracts, the regulator has to consider this opportunity cost. We
solve this problem using backward induction. First, we define the second-
period optimal contracts that maximize the regulator’s second period payoff
(for a given stock and updated beliefs). Then, we derive the first-period op-
timal contracts knowing that in the second period, the optimal contracts are
implemented.
Second-period contracts
The second period problem is the same as the static one except that the
prior beliefs are replaced by the revised ones (ν1). The regulator maximizes
his payoff for a given stock, subject to the firm participation (13) and (14),
incentive (15) and (16) and stock constraints (18) and (17):
max
{q2,t2},{q2,t2}
UG2 = ν1 t2 + (1− ν1) t2 (12)
subject to
p2 q2 − C(θ, q2)− t2 ≥ 0 (13)
p2 q2 − C(θ, q2)− t2 ≥ 0 (14)
p2 q2 − C(θ, q2)− t2 ≥ p2 q2 − C(θ, q2)− t2 (15)
p2 q2 − C(θ, q2)− t2 ≥ p2 q2 − C(θ, q2)− t2 (16)
q1 + q2(ν1) ≤ S (17)
q1 + q2(ν1) ≤ S (18)
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This is a standard problem where we should consider (14) and (15) binding.
The problem is exactly the same as the full commitment one except that ν0
is replaced by ν1. Indeed, under full commitment the allocation is the same
as the repetition of the optimal static contracts at each period. The efficient
firm extracts the first best as under the full commitment and the inefficient
firm’s extraction is exactly the same as under full commitment except that
ν0 is replaced by ν1.
One can show that the non binding participation (13) and incentive (16)
constraints are satisfied:
U2L = U2R = ∆θ qNC2 (ν1) ⇔ (13) is always satisfied.
U2R = 0 and U2L = −∆ θ (qNC2 (ν1)−qNC2 (ν1)) < 0⇔ (16) is always satisfied
as the efficient firm always produces at least as much as the inefficient one.
ν1 can be equal to ν1 or ν1 depending on which contract has been chosen
in the first period. The second period non commitment scheme is similar to
the full commitment one except that, beliefs have been revised according to
the firm’s strategy in the first period. The trade off between rent extraction
and efficiency favours efficiency when ν1 is low and the rent extraction when
ν1 is high. If ν0 > ν1, for a given price path and a given stock, compared to
the full commitment scheme, the quantity extracted by the inefficient firm is
more intensive. Because the regulator is less confident about facing an effi-
cient firm he is less willing to distort the quantity extracted by the inefficient
firm to reduce the efficient firm’s rent. If the posterior beliefs are such that
ν0 < ν1, the extraction of the inefficient firm is less intensive than under full
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commitment.
If the regulator does not know at the end of the first period the type of
firms he faces, the efficient firm gets an informational rent.
If the regulator knows at the end of the first period the type of firms he
faces, in the second period, only one contract is proposed (the symmetric in-
formation one). If ν1 = 1, the contract proposed is
{
qFB2 , t
FB
2
}
and if ν1 = 0,
the contract proposed is
{
qFB2 , t
FB
2
}
. Compared to under full commitment,
the regulator is able to correct the inefficient firm’s productive distortion and
the efficient firm does not receive a rent.
First-period contracts
The firm knows its first period strategy affects the second period contracts
through the updated belief and the stock and thus uses global incentive and
participation constraints. These constraints take into account that in the
second period, the inefficient firm never gets a rent and does not have the
incentive to lie. Therefore, its participation and incentive constraints are
only composed by the first-period payoff. Furthermore, as the efficient firm
is indifferent between lying and telling the truth it gets an informational rent:
∆θ q2(ν1). The incentive and participation global constraints used to solve
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the regulator problem are:
p1 q1 − C(θ, q1)− t1 + δ∆θ q2(ν1) ≥ 0 (19)
p1 q1 − C(θ, q1)− t1 ≥ 0 (20)
p1 q1 − C(θ, q1)− t1 + δ∆θ q2(ν1) ≥ p1 q1 − C(θ, q1)− t1 + δ∆θ q2(ν1) (21)
p1 q1 − C(θ, q1)− t1 ≥ p1 q1 − C(θ, q1)− t1 (22)
Depending on the binding constraints different equilibria occur. In each case
(20) binds; if not, one could always increase the tax revenue and keep the
other constraints satisfied. Furthermore, (19) is implied by (20) and (21).
Hence three cases may occur: only the efficient firm’s incentive constraint
binds (standard case), only the inefficient firm’s incentive constraint binds
(case II) and both incentive constraints bind (case III). One can show that
case II, is only incentive compatible when both types produce the same quan-
tity (when this contract is similar to a full pooling contract). Furthermore,
we did not report case III as the extraction path and the results mainly de-
pends on the x and y relative values.
Standard contract
In this case (20) and (21) bind. The efficient firm is indifferent between
lying and telling and may randomize its action (reveal or lie). We consider
that the inefficient firm reveals (y = 0) and we check ex post under which
conditions its incentive constraint is satisfied. In the first period, if the
contract
{
q1, t1
}
is chosen, there is symmetric information, the regulator
proposes in the second period only the efficient firm’s first best contract (ν1 =
19
1). If the contract
{
q1, t1
}
is chosen, the regulator still faces an asymmetric
information problem but revises his belief according to the strategy observed:
ν1 = (1−x) ν0(1−x) ν0+(1−ν0) ≤ ν0
Lemma 3 As ν1 < ν0, the second period extraction of an inefficient firm is
higher than under full commitment. Furthermore, as ν1 decreases with x, an
increase in x increases the inefficient firm’s second period extraction.
Depending on the value of x, different equilibria occur. For x = 1, the first
period contracts are fully separating and the inefficient firm extracts the
same as under full commitment. In the second period, there is symmetric
information and the first best contracts are proposed. For x = 0, the efficient
firm pools with an inefficient firm. In the second period, the contracts are
the same as under full commitment. For x ∈]0, 1[, semi separating contracts
are implemented.
When
{
q1, t1
}
is chosen, there is full information in the second period. Only
the efficient firm’s first best contract is proposed and thus the firm has no
information rent in the second period. The incentive and participation con-
straints of the efficient firm (19) and (21) can be rewritten:
p1 q1 − C(q1, θ)− t1 ≥ 0 (23)
p1 q1 − C(q1, θ)− t1 ≥ p1 q1 − C(q1, θ)− t1 + δ∆θ q2(ν1) (24)
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The regulator’s payoff is the weighted sum of the possible transfers he
might get:
max
{q1,t1},{q1,t1}
UG
NC = ν0 (x t1 + (1− x) t1) + (1− ν0) t1
+δ
{
ν0 x t
FB
2 + (ν0 (1− x) + (1− ν0)) [ν1 t2 + (1− ν1) t2]
} (25)
subject to (23) (20) (24) (22) (26) (27) (28) with
q1 + q2(ν1) ≤ S (26)
q1 + q2(ν1) ≤ S (27)
q1 + q2(ν1) ≤ S (28)
The first part of the payoff is the transfer the regulator gets when the firm
is efficient (it may lie or tell the truth). The second part is the transfer when
the firm is inefficient (the regulator gets all the rent). The last part is the sec-
ond period transfer, full information if the firm is efficient and tells the truth
and asymmetric information if the firm is inefficient or if it is efficient and lies.
Solving this problem, one can show that:
The efficient firm extracts the first best level and thus the same as un-
der full commitment. Whether it lies or reveals it gets a payoff equal to
∆θ(qNC1 + δ qNC2 ). If it reveals, this payment is given in the first period.
The optimal extraction of an inefficient firm depends on S, p1, p2, b, θ,
θ, ν0 and x. There are several solution depending on which stock constraints
bind and we focus on three cases: in the second period, (i) none of the stock
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constraint or only (26) bind, (ii)(26) and (28) bind, (iii) all the the stock
constraints bind.
i) If θd ≤ θ ≤ p1(1 − ν0 x) + ν0 xθ, none of the firms exhaust the resource
or only an efficient firm that reveals its type. It is optimal to extract in the
first period:
qNC1NE = qFB1NE −
∆θ ν0 x
b (1− ν0 x) (29)
ii) If Max {θe, θf} ≤ θ ≤ Max {θd, θg}, only the efficient firm exhausts the
stock (whatever its strategy in the first period is). It is optimal to extract in
the first period:
qNC1E = qFB1NE −
ν0[∆θ(x− δ(1− x))− δ(1− x)Z(θ)]
b(1− ν0 x+ δν0(1− x)) (30)
with Z(θ) = 2θ + bS − p2 − p1
θd = (1− ν0 x)(p1 − p2 − bS) + θ(2ν0 x− 1)
θe = θν0 x+ (δ(θ − p2)− bS + p1)ν0(1− x) + (p1 − bS)(1− ν0)
θf = θν0((1+δ)(ν0 x(x−1)+1)−(ν0+δ)x)(1−ν0 x)(1+δν0−(1+δ)ν0 x)+1−ν0 −
(bS−p2−p1)(1−ν0)(1−ν0 x)
(1−ν0 x)(1+δν0−(1+δ)ν0 x)+1−ν0
θg = θ ν0 x+ (δ(θ + bS − p2) + p1)ν0(1− x) + p1(1− ν0)
iii) If θb(1−ν0 x)+ν0 xθ ≤ θ ≤ Min
{
θc(1− ν0 x) + ν0 xθ, θa 2(1−ν0)(1−ν0 x)(1−ν0 x)2+1−ν0 + θ
ν0(1−ν0 x(2−x))
(1−ν0 x)2+1−ν0
}
(26), all firms exhaust the stock. It is optimal to extract in the first period:
q˜
NC
1E = q˜
FB
1E − ∆θ ν0 x(1−δ)b (1+δ)(1−ν0 x)
Lemma 4 The size of the first period distortion depends on which stock
constraint bind. As under commitment, the distortion depends on whether
the inefficient firm exhausts the stock. But under non commitment, it also
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depends on whether the efficient firm exhausts the remaining stock when it
lies in the first period.
If the efficient firm exhausts the remaining stock when it lies, it decreases
the quantity extracted by an inefficient firm in the first period. The trade off
between extracting in the first and second period appears even through the
inefficient firm does not exhaust the stock. In the first period, the inefficient
firm extraction lies between the first best and the full commitment ones. The
first period extraction is thus closer to the first best. If the stock is exhausted,
the second period extraction is higher than under the first best and lower
than under full commitment. As the inefficient firm’s extraction is higher
than under full commitment, the informational rent left to the efficient firm
is also higher. One can show that the regulator’s payoff is lower under non
commitment than under full commitment.
Proposition 1 Under non commitment, the efficient firm’s extraction is the
first best and the inefficient firm extracts at least as much as under full com-
mitment (except in the second period when it is optimal to exhaust the stock).
The extraction and the informational rent are higher than under full com-
mitment and the regulator’s payoff is at most equal to the full commitment
one.
The discount factor has two effects on the inefficient firm’s extraction. On
the one hand, the regulator is more willing to postpone the extraction and
thus decrease the first period extraction (resource effect). On the other hand,
the efficient firm has less incentive to reveal as its rent is ∆θ(qFC1 + δ qFC2 ).
To mitigate this effect, the regulator may have the incentive to decrease the
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inefficient firm’s second period extraction (adverse selection effect). If the
stock is exhausted by the inefficient firm, an increase in the discount factor
may intensify the extraction path.
If the inefficient firm never exhausts the stock (ii), the first period ex-
traction has no impact on the informational rent associated with the second
period. The only effect of the discount factor is to decrease the first period
extraction. This is a standard Hotelling effect, the higher the discount factor
is, the less intensive the extraction is. If all types of firms exhaust the stock
(iii), both effects appear and an increase in the discount factor may intensify
the extraction.
Proposition 2 Under non commitment, if the exogenous parameters are
such that it is optimal for both firms to exhaust the stock, contrary to the
Hotelling rule, an increase in the discount factor may intensify the extraction
path as the weight of the informational rent increases.
We now study the effect of x on the regulator’s payoff. This allows us to
determine whether, the regulator proposes full pooling contracts, semi sepa-
rating contracts or fully separating contracts. Indeed, the optimal contracts
are obtained by the probability x which maximizes the regulator’s payoff.
In the three cases, when the efficient firm is more likely to reveal, the
inefficient firm’s extraction is set to a lower level in order to decrease the in-
formational rent. When x = 0, the regulator’s payoff strictly increases with
x. Thus, it is never optimal to propose a full pooling contract (if the non
binding incentive and participation constraints are satisfied for x > 0)
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When both types exhaust the stock and a corner solution occurs in the
first period, the regulator’s payoff strictly increases with x as the firm’s in-
formational rent strictly decreases with x. Thus, the regulator proposes fully
separating contracts. In the second period, the regulator perfectly updates
his beliefs, both firms produce the first best quantity. As the stock is ex-
hausted, the extraction level does not depend on the level of information.
The extraction is the same under full and non commitment and thus there is
no cost of separating the firm in the first period. Because, the regulator pro-
poses fully separating contracts and as the stock is exhausted, the regulator’s
payoff under full and non commitment is exactly the same.
Proposition 3 If the exogenous parameters are such that the non binding
participation and incentive constraints are satisfied and the stock is exhausted
by both types, the regulator is always better off when the firm reveals and thus
proposes fully separating contracts. Whatever the type of commitment is,
asymmetric information has the same effect on the contracts and extraction
levels.
In the two other cases, the regulator proposes fully separating contracts
only if the discount factor is below some threshold, if not semi separating
contracts are implemented as full separation becomes too costly.
Under fully separating contracts, the regulator’s payoff is lower than un-
der full commitment. Indeed, even if the first period extraction is the same,
in the second period as the inefficient firm extracts the first best, the infor-
mational rent left to the efficient one is too high.
Under a semi separating contract, the inefficient firm extracts at each
period higher quantity than under full commitment. An increase in x lowers
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the first period extraction and increases the second period one.
Proposition 4 If the exogenous parameters are such that the non binding
participation and incentive constraints are satisfied, none of the types ex-
hausts the stock and the discount factor is below some threshold, fully sepa-
rating contracts are implemented. If the discount factor is above the thresh-
old, the efficient firm has to be highly compensated to reveal its information
and semi separating contracts are implemented. Implementing a full pooling
contract is never optimal.
If the stock is exhausted, when the discount factor increases, the regu-
lator’s payoff under non commitment moves closer to the full commitment
one. If not, the regulator’s payoff under non commitment moves away from
the full commitment one.
We now have to check if the non binding constraints: the inefficient firm’s
incentives (22) and the efficient firm’s participation (23) constraints are satis-
fied at the equilibrium for every couples (qNC1 , q
NC
2 , t
NC
1 , t
NC
2 ), (qNC1 , qNC2 , t
NC
1 , t
NC
2 ).
For simplicity’s sake, we did not report all the corner solutions however, there
exist several equilibria depending on the market conditions. For example, if
p1 is high, the contracts can be such that the efficient firm exhausts the
stock in the first period whereas the inefficient firm spreads the extraction
over time. For a very high p2 it might be optimal for both firms to exhaust
the stock in the second period and be inactive in the first.
U(L) = U(R) = ∆θ(qNC1 + δ qNC2 ) (23) is always satisfied
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U(L) = ∆θ(qNC1 +δ qNC2 −qNC1 ) (22) is only satisfied if qNC1 ≥ qNC1 +δ qNC2 (ν1)
The inefficient firm gets no rent in the first period when it reveals its type
so it is attracted by the efficient firm’s contract as soon as it gives a positive
payoff. If the inefficient firm lies in the first period, it captures the informa-
tional rent: ∆θ (qNC1 + δ qNC2 (ν1)) but suffers from a loss as it overextracts:
−∆θ qNC1 . We directly see that the higher the discount factor is, the harder
it is to satisfy (22).
In the second period, as the regulator is sure to face an efficient firm,
only one contract
{
qFB2 , t
FB
2
}
is proposed. If the inefficient firm accepts this
contract, it suffers from a loss: ∆θ qFB2 , so it leaves the relationship: this
is the take-the-money-and-run strategy. The incentive constraint under non
commitment is much harder to satisfy than under full commitment1.
Under non commitment, the inefficient firm’s incentive constraint is al-
ways satisfied when the inefficient firm is inactive in the second period or
when the efficient firm extracts all the stock in the first period (the resource
price is highly decreasing). The inefficient firm’s incentive constraint is never
satisfied when both firms are inactive in the first period (the resource price
is highly increasing). Indeed, the efficient firm gets the informational rent
without suffering from the first period overextraction.
1Under full commitment, (9) is satisfied if qFC1 + q
FC
2 > q
FC
1 + qFC2
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(22) is only satisfied for sufficiently low p2 and δ and when the asymmetric
information high enough (∆θ). If (22) is not satisfied then, both incentive
constraints bind and both firms may randomize (case 3). This case highly
depends on the value each firm lies and thus is not really interesting.
Proposition 5 When the second period price or the discount factor are high,
the standard separating contracts are not incentive compatible. Indeed, be-
cause of the lack of commitment the efficient firm has to be highly compen-
sated for its private information and thus, the contract becomes attractive for
an inefficient firm.
As the standard contract is not always incentive compatible, the regula-
tor has to use another contract when the market conditions are such that
this contract cannot be implemented.
The pooling contract
The regulator only proposes one contract at each period: {q1, t1} , {q2, t2}.
As only one contract is proposed, there is no need for incentives constraints
and only the participation constraints matter. The inefficient firm’s partici-
pation constraint binds and the contracts are such that the firm extracts at
each period, the inefficient firm first best quantity. If the firm is efficient it
gets a positive rent: U = ∆ θ(qFB1 + δ qFB2 ).
This pooling contract leads to decrease in the regulator’s payoff compared to
the standard separating contracts. This loss of revenue is increasing with ∆θ
and ν0 except for the extreme case (0, S) which was not incentive compatible
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and where UFCR = UNCR = UPR
Proposition 6 A pooling contract can always be substituted to the standard
separating contracts when they are not incentive compatible. The extraction
is the same as under symmetric information if the firm is inefficient. This
contract entails a distortion at the top as the efficient firm extracts lower
quantity than the first best. The efficient firm gets a high informational rent
and the inefficient one gets nothing. This contract lower the regulator’s payoff
compared when standard separating contracts are used.
5 Conclusion
If there is asymmetric information, the lack of commitment can be costly for
the regulator as the information disclosed unable to correct for the inefficient
firm’s productive distortion and this increases the informational rent left to
the efficient one. However, as the production of non renewable resources is
limited, the problem changes.
If firms are efficient, the stock is relatively low and the price path is
smooth, all types of firms exhaust the stock and spread the extraction over
time. Having symmetric information comes without costs. Indeed, the pro-
duction in the second period is the remaining stock of resources and thus is
the same under symmetric and asymmetric information. As a consequence,
the regulator always prefers to separate firms in the first period, and the lack
of commitment has no effect on the firms and regulator’s payoffs, only the
asymmetric information has. Hence, having long term or short term con-
tracts has no impact under asymmetric information as long as the stock of
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resource is exhausted by all types of firms. The contracts implemented are
such that efficient firms produce the first best and get an informational rent
whereas inefficient ones produce lower quantity.
Nevertheless, under non commitment, those contracts may not be incen-
tive compatible. If the discount factor is high, inefficient firms may have the
incentive to take the money and run as the informational rent left to the
efficient firm is high and given as an upfront payment. In the first period,
inefficient firms produce high quantity compared to their efficiency and pay
a low payment to the government, in the second period they produce noth-
ing as they leave the contract. To avoid this strategy, the regulator has to
propose a pooling contract. Using a pooling contract implies that the govern-
ment define a standard taxation scheme that applies for all firms whatever
their efficiency are. In this case, efficient firms produce low quantity and get
high informational rents whereas inefficient firms produce the same as under
symmetric information.
In addition, if some firms are inefficient, the stock of resource is high and
the price of resource is low, the stock may not be exhausted by all types of
firms and the regulator might be better off with some amount of pooling.
In this case, efficient firms produce the first best and get a relatively high
informational rent whereas inefficient firms produce higher quantity than if
the regulator is able to commit to long term contracts but lower quantity
than the first best. Asymmetric information usually slows the extraction
down but the lack of commitment decreases this effect, as the extraction is
higher in both periods than under full commitment.
As an extension to this work, one should also study the case of renegotiation-
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proof contracts (the regulator and the firm sign a long term contract and are
able to renegotiate the contract whenever it is mutually favourable). In case
of renegotiation-proof contracts, the allocation usually lies between the non
and full commitment.
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